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We have a coherent and combative 
position…transform an activity dedicated to making 
massive and undifferentiated products, to products 
high in quality able to be differentiated by the 
market. 
Centro de Bodegueros de Mendoza, “El valor de la 
coherencia,” Bodegas y terruños, # 1 (March 1999), 
44. 
 
The rise of exports starting in the second half of the 
1990s was perhaps the most transcendental 
phenomenon of the local wine industry, not only 
because it reflected the enormous potential of a 
greater insertion of domestic production 
internationally, but also because of its repercussions 
for wine production as well as for the marketing of 
Argentine wine and consequently for wine business 
strategies.   
Daniel Aspiazu and Eduardo Basualdo, Estudios sectorales. 
Componente: Industria vítivinícola.  Buenos Aires: 
CEPAL-ONU, 2003, 15. 
 
Argentina emerges.  Argentina’s wine industry is 
experiencing astonishing growth, both in production 
and international acceptance….And if you taste a 
rich Argentinean Malbec, all this makes perfect 
sense. 
Adam Strum, “Top 10 Wine Stories of 2006,” The 
Wine Enthusiast, XX:1 (January 31, 2006), 10. 
 
I know that 50 percent of spending on marketing is wasted.  
The problem is, I don’t know which 50 percent.   
Old marketing dictum. 
 
Early in the twentieth century, Argentina became the world’s fifth largest wine producer, 
but until very recently its wines were little known and even less appreciated outside of 
the country.  During the last decade, however, Argentina’s wine isolation came to an end.  
In the words of the world’s most influential wine critic, Robert Parker, “a new generation   3
of Argentinean vignerons [has] begun to realize this country’s, and particularly the 
province of Mendoza’s, extraordinary potential….Now their finest wines can compete on 
the world stage…one after another breakthrough wines have pushed Argentina to the 
forefront of the modern winemaking revolution.”
1   
 
The sharp rise in the export of Argentine wines demonstrates that Parker’s enthusiasm is 
shared by international consumers.  In only eight years between 1998 and 2006, they 
grew at a rate of over 30 percent a year.  The leading protagonist of Argentina’s 
appearance on the international stage has been its numerous, highly appreciated bottlings 
of Malbec.  Of wines sent abroad, the varietal more than doubles its closest competitor 
(Cabernet Sauvignon), totaling 30 percent of exports overall and 50 percent of fine wine 
sales.  As Parker explains it, “Malbec, a grape long considered challenging and often 
disappointing in France, produces prodigious wines of great perfume, quality and 
longevity in Argentina.  Malbec is the red wine hope of Argentina…”
2  Led by the 
growing popularity of its emblematic Malbec grape, Argentina has rapidly built a 
reputation as a producer of desirable, sought after wines.   
 
In 2007 Argentine wines were exported to 116 countries, with a particularly strong 
showing in the United States.  Between 2005 and 2006 alone, sales to the U.S. increased 
a full 78 percent in value.  Presently, the U.S. market receives nearly 40 percent of all 
Argentine wines exported.
3  Great Britain and Canada, with 8 percent each, have been the 
next largest export destinations, followed by Brazil, Denmark, the Low Countries, 
Russia, and Sweden.
4  International demand has been so high that in 2007 winery owners   4
began to complain they were reaching the limit of capacity and were increasingly having 
trouble meeting demand from external markets.
5   
 
In large part the success of Argentina’s export development has resulted from the 
convergence of possessing an attractive grape variety and producing appealing wines 
with it.  But that is far from the whole story.  This paper analyzes the reasons for the 
international emergence of Argentine wines, and specifically of the country’s emblematic 
Malbec. To understand the industry’s success, I examine various questions: 
 
1.  When did Argentina, historically a country that exported only an infinitesimal 
percentage of its total wine production, begin to make an effort to reach 
international markets?  Judging by their success, the Argentines made the right 
decisions, but, why, and who made them? 
2.  Does Argentina possess unique comparative advantages that have contributed to 
wine export growth? 
3.  How have the Argentines achieved export growth and specifically built Malbec as 
an emblematic grape?  In other words, what have been the successful elements of 
the industry’s export business and marketing strategy?  
4.  Is Malbec a temporary trend?  Will it last medium and long-term?   
 
Before addressing these questions, it is important to note that Argentine wines have 
increased their international presence at a time of notable growth in non-traditional 
consumer markets, especially of New World wines and of higher quality fine wines.  As   5
wine consumption has been decreasing in Europe’s historic wine countries, France in 
particular, expansion in the U.S. and the U.K. has been significant; with a growth rate of 
approximately 5 percent per year, the United States is predicted to surpass France and 
Italy by the end of the decade to become the leader in global wine consumption.
6
 
All these expanding markets share important characteristics that illuminate Argentina’s 
success.  Their consumers characteristically seek diversity and are therefore open to new 
types of wine.  Many are confused by traditional wine classifications such as Bordeaux or 
Chianti.  These names seem less useful for predicting the taste or quality of a wine than 
the identification of specific grape varietals, a trend that achieved prominence with the 
success of the California industry in the 1980s.  Argentina’s emphasis on Malbec fits well 
the desire for “something new,” and is at the same time clearly identifiable.  
 
It is commonplace to believe that Argentina simply adopted the successful export strategy 
launched by neighboring Chile nearly twenty years earlier when, in fact, Argentine 
winemakers point to Australia as their model.  The attractiveness of Australia is not 
surprising given the parallel between Argentina’s focus on Malbec and the central 
importance of Shiraz to that country’s enormous success in recent years.
7  Argentina may 
not have copied Chile’s strategy, but the success of Malbec in the creation of Argentina’s 
international identity has not been lost to its trans-Andean neighbor.  Chile has tried to 
market Carmenere as its own unique contribution to wine consumers just as South Africa 
has attempted to establish an identity with Pinotage.  Yet neither has paralleled the   6
success of Argentina’s Malbec. Notably, in the period that Argentine exports to the US 
were growing by nearly 80 percent, Chile, barely achieved any increase at all.
8  
    
Before Exports 
 
Argentina’s recent international success obscures the fact that an export strategy was 
almost totally absent from country’s wine industry for the first hundred years.  From its 
beginnings in the 1880s, the core strategy was to produce for an expanding domestic 
consumer market based on the perception of a rapidly growing local demand for cheap 
wines that would perennially outstrip production capacity.  Analysts from the turn of the 
twentieth century through the 1970s largely concurred about the strong belief in a 
“comfortable” market.  That market was composed largely of immigrants from Italy and 
Spain, and later by their descendents.  For these consumers, wine was considered a 
necessary part of the daily diet. Although coming from places with well-established 
wine traditions, they rarely showed interest in a high quality product. Rather, the main 
concern was access to abundant and, above all, cheap wines.  
 
In the 1970s, when Argentine consumption reached an all-time high of ninety liters per-
capita, the public drank wines made for the so-called “Argentine taste.” Heavily colored 
and alcoholic --bordering on thirteen percent--, they ended up as a sweetish drink similar 
to poor quality sherry. They were, in the words of prestigious winemaker Paul Hobbs, 
“tired wines.”  As a result, it was commonplace for consumers to make attempts at 
“improving” wine flavor by adding ice and soda to both whites and reds.
9  7
 
Just when wine production was reaching its all-time high in the late 1970s, the 
cornerstone of the domestic market was starting to show clear fault-lines as Argentines 
began to drastically curtail their consumption.  At the end of the decade, a severe 
economic recession cut deeply into the purchasing power of the population, and 
simultaneously, alternative beverages, specifically beer and soft drinks began to 
experience rapid growth.  Necessity would have to become the mother of invention for 
the survival of the Argentine wine industry. 
 
Argentina’s Wine Revolution  
  
Faced by an enormous imbalance between supply and demand, a small number of 
forward-looking entrepreneurs realized that the very viability of the industry was 
threatened without profound and fundamental changes; the key change was to seek new 
prospects beyond the shrinking domestic market. Led by Nicolás Catena Zapata, one of 
the few winery owners who survived the crisis with all his resources intact, they began in 
the late 1980s a process that would become known as the “reconversión” of the 
Argentine wine industry.  Among the key strategies that drove the reconversión were: 
•  The pursuit of international consumers, given the contraction of the industry’s 
local market.   
•  Concentration on the production of wines that could attain sufficient quality to 
compete internationally.    8
•  Sweeping upgrades in technology both in the winery and in the vineyard focused 
on quality improvement. 
•  And guiding the whole process, a fundamental change from a producer-centered 
to a consumer-centered industry model.  
 
 
Our Saviors May Not Speak Spanish  
 
On a consulting trip to Argentina in 2000, French wine marketing guru Michel Bourqui 
declared: “Before you worked for a wine drinking market.  Today you have to take aim at 
a market that looks for pleasure.”
10   Translation: drinking market = domestic consumers; 
pleasure = international consumers.  Bourqui’s comments reflected an already prevalent 
faith among Argentine producers in the strategic importance of exports.  By the time of 
his visit, more and more industry leaders had been insisting that international markets 
were the salvation of the industry. The bold assertion in the two-page title of a 1999 
article in the industry association magazine is a case in point: “Adapt the product TO 
THE TASTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONSUMER.”
11  What had become an 
industry cant was repeated once more in 2004 by Angel Vespa, the Director of the Wine 
Industry Association:  “The Argentine wine sector faces a great mission: to consolidate 
its position as a trusted supplier of wines to broad international markets.”
12   
 
Judging by the numbers, the industry met Vespa’s challenge head on.  Between 1998 and 
2006, exports grew in quantity and dollar value by nearly equal percentages:  368 percent   9
in volume and 366 percent in value. Even more notable, during the most successful years 
of the export boom from 2002 through 2006 earnings (404 percent) substantially 
outpaced gains in volume (338 percent), reflecting the emphasis on higher priced fine 
wines over cheaper table wines.   In 1989, when wineries were just beginning to test the 
international waters, fine and reserve wines accounted for only 19 percent of exports, but 
by 1994 that proportion climbed rapidly to 53 percent.  In 2006, a full 77 percent of 
exports were fine wines, and in 2007 the trend continued, reaching 82 percent by mid-
year.  Within the fine wine category, industry experts remark that sales of high-end 
products are growing nearly two times faster than their less expensive wines; indeed, the 
lowest priced wines have actually decreased in sales by over 10 percent.  Quantitatively 
and qualitatively, it would appear that the title of a 1999 article in the wine association’s 
publication, early on in the process, did not exaggerate when declaring that: “LA 
EXPORTACION DE VINOS TRANSFORMO EL SECTOR” (THE EXPORT OF WINES 
TRANSFORMED THE SECTOR).
13   
 
In seeking the origins of this approach, the decisions of a handful of export pioneers stand 
out.  At the top of the list is Nicolás Catena, owner of Bodegas Esmeralda and later 
Bodega Nícolas Catena Zapata in Argentina’s most important wine region of Mendoza.  
Coming from a family with a long tradition of successful production of table wines for 
Argentina’s undifferentiated domestic market, he took over the firm in 1963 at the age of 
twenty-two and made it into the country’s leading supplier of bottled wine.  In the early 
1980s, while pursuing a post-doc at the University of California Berkeley, he observed 
first-hand the rise of the Napa wine phenomenon, literally sitting at the feet of Robert   10
Mondavi.  Catena appears to have listened closely to Mondavi’s lessons about the 
enormous potential for New World wines to challenge the Old World in quality.  And 
fully aware of the demand crisis in Argentina’s domestic market, Catena went about 
converting his own enterprise into a producer of internationally competitive wines.  As he 
remarked: 
Table wine...didn’t interest me any more….Obviously the fall in 
consumption that was happening surely had an influence, but I had already 
become enamored of the concept of quality.  So I totally revised my 
objectives, and I began to invest in everything having to do with quality, 
in fine wines, nothing else.  I didn’t invest any more in table wines…I 
didn’t abandon them but basically concentrated all my enthusiasm, my 
investment capacity, my best people, to producing a different quality of 
wine.
14   
 
What is particularly noteworthy about Catena’s example is that he not only converted his 
winery to the production of premium wines but also decided from the outset to charge 
premium prices.   
 
At the end of the ‘80s I began my research into the fine wine market in the 
United Status.  Immediately I discovered that whatever Argentine wines 
that were available were situated…in the $4 to $6 price segment in wine 
stores.  They were placed at price levels similar to Chilean wines, but were 
of inferior quality….I decided to adopt a different strategy….At the end of 
1991, I began selling Catena Cabernet Sauvignon at $15 to $16 bottle 
retail and Catena Chardonnay at $13 to $14.  We were successful.  We 
quickly sold the whole harvest and also the next two harvests at the same 
price….Our project was and is to compete not only with the best wines of 
the New World but also with the best of the Old World.
15   
 
So, when Catena began exporting in 1991, he did not follow the model of other New 
World producers and try to compete initially with a low priced product and slowly raise 
the price along with the quality.  Instead, Catena’s first export wines at $13 to $16 were   11
selling at two segments above his quite successful neighbor Chile, whose wines were 
directed almost entirely at the $3 to $7 range.
16   
 
Another of the country’s largest wineries, Peñaflor, was also among a small group of 
Argentine producers that early on saw the importance of gaining distinctiveness through 
both quality and price.  Even before Catena initiated his export project, Peñaflor began 
producing a high-end wine for the domestic market through its Trapiche winery. Angel 
Mendoza, the chief winemaker during much of the 1980s and 1990s, explained the firm’s 
first moves in this direction:  
Peñaflor was already aware that things were changing, and we began to 
bet very seriously on fine wine as we saw that the moment of fine wine 
was approaching, more than anything else premium wine.  They were 
already calculating an amount that they called aggregate value which 
produced a greater profit, that contributed more than what table wine did, 
and they were tired of competing in the table wine sector….As a result, 
the generation of Trapiche Medalla is born in 1983, which was a big bet 
on premium wine, seeking to make the most expensive wine.
17    
 
In 2000, when exports were beginning to take off, Peñaflor’s strategy to simultaneously 
raise quality and price was explicitly tied to international expansion.  As explained by 
export manager Juan José Canay: “You have to compete in the world.  Nobody is 
desperate to have our wines, and if Argentina doesn’t export, somebody else 
will....Argentina should not enter the world market with low prices because it is not a 
well thought out strategy.  Chile entered the market with this strategy and now it can’t get 
out.”  Peñaflor continued to move in this direction, increasing the average price of their 
export wines 35 percent between 2001 and 2007.   During these years, the firm’s export 
earnings rose 400 percent to the point that they totaled for some ten percent of all   12
Argentine international sales.  This helped make Peñaflor the ninth largest wine business 
in the world.
18    
 
What Doesn’t Kill You Makes You Strong 
 
What factors explain Argentina’s remarkable transformation from a mass producer of 
relatively poor quality table wines for an undifferentiated domestic market to major 
international competitor in fine wines?  First, the country’s long tradition of wine 
production provided a foundation on which to build. Second, Argentina possesses a large 
domestic market that, although weakened, has been substantial enough to provide a 
reliable cushion for industry change.  Third, conditioned by a perennial “culture of 
crisis,” Argentines have learned to maneuver in order to lose the least or to make the 
most of an uncertain environment.  This has led to the emergence of a parallel “culture of 
agility” clearly evident in the decision-making of major protagonists of the reconverted 
industry.  Fourth, when making their wines, the industry enjoys considerable flexibility in 
everything from rules and regulations to the use of appropriate terroirs.  And finally, the 
decision to “reconvert” came at a moment as rare as it was lucky in Argentine history: 
economic stability coincided with the availability of substantial financial resources to 
accomplish the task. 
 
In the 1990s, when the prospects of export growth gained precedence, Argentina was 
hardly starting from scratch.  The country had a century-old wine industry with numerous 
established vineyards, a legion of wineries of all sizes and shapes and an enormous   13
amount of accumulated experience from laborers in the vineyards to high level managers 
in the wineries.  In all these areas, of course, it was crucial to upgrade in order to achieve 
internationally competitive wines.   
 
The vineyard situation is an interesting case in point.  In the 1960s and 1970s huge 
government tax breaks had encouraged volume wine production as never before.  As a 
result, French vines that had been planted decades, in some cases up to a century earlier, 
were ripped out and replaced with uva criolla stock.  The original grape brought by 
Spanish missionaries in the colonial period, the uva criolla’s ability to produce massive 
amounts of fruit was matched by the abysmal quality of its wines.  Malbec vineyards, 
with the grape that would become the emblem of the reconversión, were nearly wiped 
out, declining from 50,000 hectares in 1970 to only 10,000 in 1990.  Still, Malbec fared 
better than other fine varieties.  Cabernet Sauvignon had been reduced to 3,500 hectares, 
and there were barely 1,000 left of Merlot and 80 of Chardonnay.  Then, during the worst 
years of industry decline in the 1980s many vineyards were completely eradicated to 
make way for suburban development.  Nevertheless, substantial acreage of excellent 
vineyard land remained as well as a critical mass of good vine stock necessary to begin 
the process of transformation.
19  
 
The fate of wineries paralleled that of the vineyards.  Small and middle-sized 
establishments were particularly vulnerable during the years of industry crisis.  Those 
that simply could not afford to update and upgrade for the most part closed their doors.  It 
was the larger, better capitalized firms that survived.  Survival did not mean, however,   14
that the transition to export production would be rapid or easy.  Famed California 
winemaker Paul Hobbs, who became a prominent actor in the transformation of Catena 
from massive producer of bulk wines to quality leader, vividly addresses the 
technological gap as he recounts his first visit to the Esmeralda winery in 1988.   
It was so ancient, their technology, all the equipment.  Everything had 
been set in place back in the early 1900s.  It hadn’t been improved upon 
since then….It was very archaic.  It was so primitive that I didn’t know 
how to use the equipment they had, and I was doubtful of the results that it 
would have in most situations.
20   
 
A similar situation affected the human resources in the industry.  Wineries had employed 
enologists from the dawn of the industry.  But as Carlos Catania, the head of the Enology 
Department at the government’s Centro de Estudios Enológicos in Mendoza observed, 
these individuals saw themselves as wine factory foremen whose job was simply to 
“ferment the wine and put it in giant tanks.  Since before people thought it was the same 
difference, whatever grape you used, the process couldn’t have been any more 
industrial.”
21  Similarly, Paul Hobbs’s unflattering comments on the content of 
winemaking knowledge in Argentina parallel his negative description of the physical 
equipment: “I spent one afternoon in the winery, and tasting their wines, I was shocked.  
They were destroying the grapes.  I couldn’t imagine what they were doing….They 
didn’t understand malolactic fermentation; they didn’t understand anything to do with 
barrels.  It was all winemaking from the beginning.
22   
 
Lack of varietal quality in the vineyards, outdated wineries and deficient enological 
knowhow: certainly.  But the vineyards, the wineries and experienced personnel were still 
present in Argentina, even after the worst downturn in the industry’s history.  To achieve   15
levels of quality capable of appealing to international consumers, however, required 
major investment in all three areas. And that is when luck played a crucial role.  Just at 
the time that eventual export leaders were beginning to make the decision to upgrade, 
macro-economic circumstances in Argentina favored an enormous influx of private 
investment.  Beginning in the 1990s as part of its deregulation of the Argentine economy, 
the government of Carlos Menem (1989-1999) eliminated rules limiting foreign 
investment, liberalized the currency exchange market, ended export duties and eased 
restrictions on imports, specifically of capital goods and services that were essential to 
the industry’s upgrading ventures.  Also, low inflation and a mandated dollar-peso parity 
exchange rate helped create a stable environment --with fixed domestic costs-- attractive 
to potential investors. Under these conditions, foreign banks in particular were eager to 
lend and became quite aggressive at making low interest, long-term loans to wine 
entrepreneurs.  The overvalued Argentine currency made the prices of imports of key 
equipment exceedingly attractive.  Surprisingly, the strong peso did not prevent land and 
labor costs in the country from remaining cheap.  Excellent vineyard land in Mendoza 
sold for half of what it would cost in Chile, a third of the price of Australia and a tenth of 
the value of Napa or France. In the end, the investment in the Argentine industry during 
the heart of the reconversión was truly staggering.  Between 1991 and 2001 it totaled an 
estimated $1 billion from abroad and $500 million locally; an additional $200 million is 
predicted through 2010.  The importance of the building exports as an incentive is clear 
considering that 70 percent of investments have gone to fund production for the 
international market.
23   
   16
Concretely, the industry used the strong peso to buy top quality imported vine stock, 
cutting-edge winery equipment and the world’s most prestigious traveling consultants.  In 
addition to importing Quality A clones, largely from France and Italy, investments in 
local nurseries has provided an accessible supply of vines adapted to local conditions. 
Vineyards also benefited, progressively changing over from flood to drip irrigation.  For 
the wineries, technological innovations meant importing a broad variety of equipment 
that had previously been absent in the Argentine industry including small oak barrels, 
stainless steel fermentation and storage tanks, bladder presses, destemmers and bottling 
equipment.   One of the most significant technological innovations was the incorporation 
of modern cooling systems; Catena, for example, was the first to construct a large cold 
chamber for the low-temperature fermentation of white wines.  By the end of the 1990s, 
some forty to fifty Argentine wineries had upgraded nearly all their equipment bringing 
their technology up to a level that matched their most advanced peers anywhere on the 
globe.  As international wine consultant Sophie Jump pronounced, “Most of them have 
got facilities that the French would die for.”
24   
 
 
With its new equipment, the industry had taken vital steps on the road to internationally 
competitive wines.  But a major obstacle remained: the lack of enological know-how. 
This was overcome through genuine improvements in the enological training received 
locally and from the assimilation of decisive influences from the outside.  Within 
Argentina, the industry’s increasing demand for trained experts produced the exponential 
growth of regional university programs and graduates.  But the most visible development   17
came from the outside.  New investments in the industry underwrote travel abroad for 
local wine makers for learning trips to prominent wineries as well as for formal study 
programs.  And it paid for prestigious wine professionals to come to Argentina to guide 
innovation.  Nicolás Catena had begun the trend in 1988 when he hired Californian Paul 
Hobbs, who had worked with Robert Mondavi on his Opus One project, to play a central 
role in the transformation of Catena Zapata.  In subsequent years, the contracting of 
foreign consultants really picked up speed.  Famous French winemaker Michel Rolland 
arrived at Peñaflor’s Trapiche winery in 1996, to be followed by other major figures 
including Alberto Antonini (Nieto Senetiner and Altos de Medrano), Jacques Lurton and 
Olivier Ruhard (Bodega Lurton), Arnaud Meillan (Favre Montmayou) and Robert Pepi 
(Valentín Bianchi).  Particularly in more recent years, consulting has not been limited to 
the production area, extending to marketing and branding.  For example, experts from the 
University of South Australia’s Wine Marketing Group Larry Lockshin and Tony 
Spawnton have put on well-attended seminars in Mendoza with titles such as “Branding 
Your Wine For Success.”
25  
 
Ironically, a key element of the explosive growth in Argentina’s wine exports, 
particularly in the new millennium, has been the continued presence of a large, if 
diminished, number of local consumers.   Back in the 1970s, the country’s primary 
market of Buenos Aires had boasted a per-capita consumption of 114 liters, placing its 
wine drinkers’ capacity at a level roughly equal their peers in the world’s highest wine 
consuming cities, Paris and Rome.  True, these levels of consumption have long been a 
faint memory.  And as mentioned previously, their precipitous fall was clearly a driving   18
force behind the resolve to export.
26   
 
Yet even with this decrease, Argentina is still the world’s fifth largest wine consuming 
country.  Indeed, the new emphasis on exports tends to cloud an important reality: in the 
midst of the export boom, domestic consumption has remained consequential.  In 2005, 
for example, the national market still drank 82 percent of all wines produced in Mendoza. 
And subsequently, per-capita consumption has risen from 29 liters to 34 liters.  The 
highly successful Peñaflor firm exemplifies the continued importance of domestic 
consumption.  Just as there is no denying its export success, equally compelling is the 
strength of Peñaflor’s sales within Argentina, paralleling quite closely the industry trend 
by generating 88 percent of the firm’s income. Additionally, as recently as 2007, of the 
approximately 2,000 wineries in Argentina, no more than 400 are involved 
internationally, and of that number a mere 20 concentrate 60 percent of exports.  In short, 
the domestic market has continued to occupy an important place in the calculations of the 
country’s wine industry.
27   
 
This awareness of the sustained weight of the domestic market is shared by all major 
Argentine producers.  The presence of this still large and even growing wine drinking 
public within Argentina facilitates making tough decisions in terms of investment and 
restructuring for export growth.  Paradoxically, it is the substantial number of domestic 
consumers that permits producers to take relatively large risks in the export area because 
they have a strong backup within their own country.
28   
   19
A distinct shift in the taste preferences of Argentine wine drinkers over the past decade 
has actually strengthened export initiatives.  As lower income groups shifted away from 
wine towards beer and soft drinks, wealthier and middle class consumers, many of whom 
spent their country’s strong national currency in the 1990s on international travel, began 
to insist on wines that tasted “as good as” those they found abroad.   An overvalued peso 
also boosted, for the first time in nearly 100 years, the importation of European and 
California wines some of which became taste setters.  So, just as overall consumption 
was dropping in Argentina, the demand for premium wines was increasing.  José Alberto 
Zuccardi, owner of Bodega Familia Zuccardi, one of the country’s most successful export 
wineries, explains the important complementarities between wines produced for 
international and national markets.  “We started to export in 1991.  At that moment we 
were aware that the greatest growth would happen abroad, but that didn’t mean that we 
weren’t going to take care of the internal market.  On the contrary, we learned many 





As winery and vineyard managers have been influenced in their production decisions by 
similar components of both international and Argentine “wine cultures,” another set of 
experiential norms helps explain the success of the industry to re-invent itself in order to 
respond to new markets at home and abroad.  They make up Argentina’s “culture of 
crisis.”  During much of its history since the early decades of nationhood in the 19
th 
century, Argentina has been a country of crisis, or perhaps more accurately, multiple   20
crises.  In the second half of the 20
th century both political and economic upheavals 
became particularly acute.  Politically, these involved sudden, at times violent changes in 
government, characterized most palpably by armed coups and frequently repressive 
military regimes.   Economically, especially striking have been succeeding stretches of 
hyperinflation reaching annual levels of up to 5,000 percent, wildly fluctuating exchange 
rates with radical devaluations and at least one period of rigid overvaluation.  
 
Out of these very difficult, often tragic, times a cultural baggage has emerged with one 
important positive: an ability to react to rapidly to difficult situations by, when 
“necessary,” radically changing directions.  Luigi Bosca owner Alberto Arizu attests to 
the permanence of insecurity and to its impact.  “We were accustomed to living in 
crisis….Building all over again was a constant.  That’s the way we survived periods of 
crisis.”  And Bodega López owner Eduardo López adds: “Argentina’s constantly 
changing circumstances apply to all enterprises.”
30 The whole reconversión process, 
which involved everything from replanting entire vineyards to focusing much of the 
industry --almost overnight-- to the development of Malbec as an emblematic varietal, is 
reflective of people very much open to experimentation.  In other words, perhaps because 
loss has become an expected part of life, some Argentines, in this case the protagonists of 
the wine industry, have become used to responding agilely to difficult situations and are 
willing, when necessary, to make risky decisions.  “Our history tells us that there will be 
a crisis about every ten years, so we always have a Plan B, and it doesn’t hurt to also 
have a Plan C.”
 31
   21
Another lesson from learned historical instability has been to hedge your bets.  This 
tendency has been clearly manifest in the decision of nearly all of Argentina’s most 
successful wineries to balance production and sales between international and domestic 
markets.  Jose Alberto Zuccardi, who grew his international sales to 60 percent of 
production in 2006 achieving fastest export growth rate in the industry, nevertheless 
emphasized in a 2007 interview, “We live in this country and we know that at times there 
are ups and downs: it’s good to be standing on both feet.”  The same sentiment was 
shared by Salentein Marketing Manager Matías Brandi who explained in 2003 that the 
firm’s goal was to shift from 60 percent domestic sales and 40 percent exports to 70 
percent exports and 30 percent local market.  “Although the shift is towards exports, the 
idea is to have balance.”
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Whatever the cultural components, the whole reconversión process has been marked with 
an extraordinary agility particularly beneficial to export growth.  It has been matched by 
other forms of agility, in regulations and terroir, which have decisively added to the 
industry’s success story.  Like other New World areas, Argentine wineries have not been 
constrained by strict Denomination of Origin laws that in many Old World areas put 
limits on grape varietals, specific wine making procedures, labeling, etc.  In essence, 
Argentine producers are free to grow their grapes, craft and sell their wines in accord 
with what they deem most important for types, quality and market preferences.
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Equally, Argentine producers have access to a range of terroirs capable of yielding a 
diverse selection of wines.  The country boasts the largest extension of vineyard lands in   22
the world, spanning over 1,000 miles from north to south; altogether, they offer a wealth 
of temperature variations and altitudes.  Indeed, various leading producers have carried 
out extensive experimentation, matching match grape varieties to specific micro-climates 
to attain a marked range of options within specific varietals.  For the emblematic Malbec, 
this has led to a host of wines from straight-forward to complex.  Additionally, the fact 
that vineyard lands are located in a veritable desert at the foot of the Andes allows for 
substantial manipulation of irrigation water to obtain desired wine outcomes.  In terms of 
terroir, then, Argentines have many more options than most of their Old World 
counterparts and even than their Chilean neighbors whose vineyards are located in a 
much more Mediterranean-like region.
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The Makers and Drinkers of Argentine Wine: Bridging the Gap 
 
For Argentina’s wine protagonists –vineyards, wineries, distributors-- what has been truly 
revolutionary is the fundamental shift from a production-focused to a consumer-focused 
industry.  In the first hundred years, decision-making revolved around grape prices, 
winery capacities, inflation, shifting exchange rates and preventing (or participating in) 
the watering of wine at the winery or at the point of sale. Former Trapiche winemaker 
Angel Mendoza boiled it all down to, “the whole speculative game from the production 
perspective, without looking at all at the consumer.”
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With the prospects of rapid export growth and a recovering and changed domestic 
market, the actions José Alberto Zuccardi demonstrate the newfound sensitivity to the   23
“power of the consumer.” Signs placed throughout his winery read: “This project is 
entirely paid for by those consumers who choose our products.”
36  Adding substance to 
Zuccardi’s strongly voiced maxim, Margareth Henríquez, CEO of Chandon’s operations 
in Argentina, explained in a 2003 interview how her firm places the consumer at the core: 
“We have to get to know the wine drinkers better, understand what they want, interpret 
their new needs and adapt and develop products and services to respond to the new 
reality.”  Long time industry observer Mariano González is even more concrete. He 
distills the convergence with consumers to four pivotal components: “establish Malbec as 
an umbrella brand through which each winery can organize its way forward;”  “respond 
to the needs of the market…seeking a balance between those needs and what the winery 
can offer;” “improve the price/quality ratio;” and establish “the image…communicate the 
excellence of our wines to the world.” In sum, the task at hand is to develop an effective 
marketing strategy for Argentine wines.
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As suggested by González, Malbec would become the key ingredient of that strategy.  
But its ascendance was neither always clear nor easy. As late as 2000, Malbec continued 
to be considered by most wine makers less promising than Cabernet Sauvignon, than 
Syrah and even than scarcely planted Pinot Noir.  What was worse, as the Research and 
Marketing Director of the government’s Instituto Nacional de Vítivinicultura reported, 
still in 2000 Malbec vines were being pulled out to make way for new highways and 
housing developments. Despite being the most widely planted fine wine red grape, many 
resisted making it Argentina’s emblematic wine.  Even industry leader Nicolás Catena 
initially overlooked Malbec, instead choosing the most established French varietals for   24
his first premium wines: Chardonnay and Cabernet Sauvignon. After all, he explained in 
1995, “the international criteria of quality…are defined by the best French wines.  The 
most expensive wines of Bordeaux and Burgundy have won that privilege.”
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Catena’s view on the value of Malbec would soon change.  Perhaps he remembered that 
his father and grandfather had dreamed of making quality wines with the grape.  Perhaps 
he began listening to his California consultant Paul Hobbs, his vineyard manager Pedro 
Marchevsky and his U.S. distributor Alfredo Bartholomaus who all advocated for an 
earnest endeavor with Malbec.  Whatever the reasons, by the end of the 1990s he had 
become convinced of the varietal’s potential and made it an integral part of his portfolio.  
Others, like Trapiche wine maker Angel Mendoza, cite Australia’s success with Shiraz as 
decisive for establishing Malbec as Argentina’s signature grape and for making wine with 
similar characteristics to Australia’s market leader.  “We identified our challenge at all 
the wine fairs.  We tasted Australian wine, and we said: ‘We have to change.  If we want 
to adopt that model, we have to change.’  We winemakers would go from stand to stand 
tasting and we would say, ‘Look at the fruit, look at the color, look, this is the expression 
of the way wine should be made.’”
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In succeeding years Malbec decisively left behind its lower status among Argentine 
wines, instead becoming the driving force for international success.  In the words of 
importer/distributor Julio Suárez, “Malbec put us on the map worldwide.” And as 
Catena’s own export manager Cecilia Razquin explained in 2007, “For the first 
time…there is a recognition of an Argentine Malbec fashion.” Now the country’s top   25
wineries proudly stage expert tastings of their best Malbec bottlings at international wine 
shows such as the one led by arguably the world’s most renowned wine advisor, Michel 
Rolland, at the 2005 edition of Bordeaux’s prestigious Vinexpo.
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Among a variety of explanations for Malbec’s rise, two stand out.  First, the varietal gives 
Argentina a unique identity in the wine world.  “No-one else has Malbec like us,” 
declares industry executive Sofía Pescarmona.
41 As “new” as it is distinctive, Argentina’s 
Malbec attracts that growing international market which seeks diverse wine experiences.  
Of course, diversity is one thing; producing an appealing wine is quite another.  On that 
score, Argentine Malbec received an enormous boost from influential critic Robert 
Parker’s 2004 pronouncement that it had attained “startling heights in quality” and his 
accompanying prediction-- among the twelve he made for the following decade—that 
Malbec would ascend “into the pantheon of noble wines.”
42  And one need only read the 
list of enticing descriptors for Argentine Malbec over the past few years to recognize its 
considerable allure: “juicy, fruit-driven profile” “vivid purple and blue fruits: “lush, ripe,” 
“sexy, supple texture” “fleshy yet seductive” “flamboyant” “big and bold” “long and 
powerful”.  Wines with these qualities certainly have intrinsic attractiveness.  Moreover, 
they are prized by the increasing numbers of consumers who favor bold, highly 
concentrated wines, characterized by forward fruit flavors, high alcohol and limited notes 
of earth.  In short, given the tastes of growing international market segments, Argentina’s 
Malbecs have gained considerable acceptance and visibility. Stories in the popular press 
about Argentine wine highlighting the virtues of Malbec abound: “Argentina: Malbec 
Becoming ‘It’ Grape” or “Mmm, Mmm Malbec! 
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While Argentine wine makers have undoubtedly been influenced in export production 
decisions by the broad trend towards New World styles, they have undertaken only 
sporadic market research, largely limited to the purchase of surveys on overall 
consumption trends. Of course, many sought out international consultants for advice, not 
only about appropriate technology but also about market issues. Their counsel has 
undoubtedly played a major role in the development of appealing wines as well as for 
correcting defects.  But Argentine wineries have had limited direct contact with their 
international clients, especially when designing new products.  They have not, for 
example, generally supported controlled taste tests that might provide information on 
consumers’ reactions to the sensory qualities of prospective bottlings.  Of course, even 
wineries that might want to carry out concerted research in export markets face severe 
impediments.  In the United States, for instance, direct contact with consumers is made 
extremely difficult by the three-tier wine distribution system of producer, 
importer/distributor and retailer.  Consequently, Argentine wineries have rarely obtained 
systematic information about the preferences of their potential and eventual customers.   
 
What wineries may receive is informal feedback from importers and distributors.  
Veteran importer Alfredo Bartholomaus relates that he offers details on the taste 
preferences of the U.S. market to enolgists at his affiliated wineries, “knowing what sells 
and what doesn’t in the U.S.”  Patricia Ortiz, the CEO of Bodega Tapiz, acknowledges a 
somewhat greater influence, explaining that reactions from several international 
distributors convinced the winery to eliminate wood aging for Chardonnay altogether and   27
to reduce it in their reds, especially by cutting back on American oak, in order to achieve 
fruitier and fresher flavors preferred by consumers.
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Wine fairs constitute a venue where some wineries have sought out tangible responses 
from retailers and consumers. The value of these events for gauging preferences is, 
however, debatable.  On the one hand, many of those who attend seem chiefly intent on 
trying as many wines as possible, infrequently entering into dialogue with exhibitors.  At 
best, they may comment about wines they like, but not necessarily with complete 
sincerity; frank criticism of specific wines is exceedingly rare. For the trade, fairs are 
customarily dedicated to networking more than to evaluating specific wines.  And as one 
prominent sommelier comments, especially when the winemaker is present -- the person 
who would most profit from hearing a frank opinion--, “You don’t say much, so as not to 
make them feel bad.”
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Nevertheless, some wineries spend substantial resources on tables and booths at fairs to 
“listen and learn.”  When questioned about the above-mentioned limitations of these 
events for garnering useful feedback, importer/distributor Julio Suárez explains that not 
all fairs are equal.  He claims that it is specifically at the upscale fairs, with high entrance 
fees and limited attendance, where his suppliers have been able not only to gauge the 
opinions of trend-setting consumers but also to “get their wines out” to this group.
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Trips by journalists and retailers, underwritten by wineries and wine associations, are of 
even more questionable value for garnering substantive responses.  As the owner of the   28
largest U.S. chain of retail outlets specializing in Argentine wine observes, “The tactic of 
inviting trade people to Argentina has almost no market research value or even goal.  
People have good times, good wines, all free.”  That a key part of the agenda is to pamper 
the visitors may actually be counterproductive in terms of receiving feedback.  As our 
sommelier reflects, “After all, you don’t want to insult the people who feed you.  So you 
can’t talk badly about anything.”
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One area of market strategy where consumers, retailers and distributors have had 
significant impact is wine pricing, often provoking moments of tension.  Prominent 
retailer Claudio Kosjuner remarks, “the wineries think you want to lower the price.  They 
don’t trust you.”  Nevertheless, producers are acutely aware that price can be a decisive 
factor in the decision to buy at all levels of the distribution chain.  When Trapiche 
spokesperson Brigitte Barriero described the winery’s efforts to “tailor the wines to the 
U.S. market,” she referred not to the contents of the bottles but to their price points.  
Winemaker Angel Mendoza is more direct in his explanation. “The new heads of the 
industry are the distributors and the supermarkets.  They are the buyers.  Now, today, we 




Importer/distributor Suárez explains the system through which many if not most prices 
are established:  
 
For pricing strategy, we start with the consumer price and back up.  The 
distributor and the retailer taste the wine and give feedback on what they   29
think it can sell for.  Roughly speaking, the retail price of the wine is FOB 
X 3.  If a distributor tastes a wine at, say, “FOB $5.00 but says that it can 
sell for $10.00 and not more, the winery must change its prices.  If the 
wine is overpriced, I’m not going to sell it. In the low price range in 
particular –under $10.00 wines-- $1.00 or $2.00 is gigantic.  $1.00 can 
make all the difference.
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Of course, as we have seen with the case of Argentine pioneer Nicolás Catena, one 
effective strategy was to price wines at a relatively high level to create expectations of 
quality. But even he admits that to achieve success “is a great challenge, because it is 




When Catena began to export his Chardonnay and Cabernet Sauvignon in the 1990s, he 
and his peers were at a distinct disadvantage versus international rivals.  The same 
overvalued currency that had subsidized the transformation of the industry made it 
difficult to compete on price against wines from other regions. This situation changed 
radically in 2001 when the country suffered one of the worst economic crises in the past 
hundred years.  To large numbers of Argentines, it seemed that they were living in an 
“underdeveloping country” as poverty reached unimaginable levels, cutting deeply into 
the middle and working classes.  But an attendant effect of the crisis was the breaking of 
the peso/dollar parity system; in short order, the peso descended from 1-to-1 with the 
dollar to 4-to-1, eventually stabilizing at 3-to-1.  For the Argentine wine industry, the 
change in currency value could not have come at a better time.  Those wineries that had 
been able to acquire state-of-the-art equipment and know-how with the strong peso, after 
2002 took advantage of a weaker currency and low and declining land and labor costs to   30
place their wines among the world’s leaders in price/quality ratio.  Luis Steindl, the CEO 
of Mendoza’s Bodega Norton explains: “You can get the same quality (of wine) as other 
areas, and the direct cost of production is probably one-quarter of what it’d be in the 
United States and even less that what it would be in France.”  In the unvarnished verdict 
of industry newcomer Michael Evans, “You can make better wine here for less money 
than anywhere else in the world.”  Journalist David J. Lynch’s conclusion is telling, even 
if only part of the story: “It is not complex noses or poignant bouquets that explain 
Argentina’s recent emergence in global wine markets, notably including the United 
States. It’s basic economics.”  Tapiz’s Patricia Ortiz fundamentally concurs: “If the peso 
goes to one-to-one again, we’re dead.”
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What Lynch and others leave out of the equation is that those same favorable economic 
factors that help to keep prices moderate have also permitted producers to make 
substantial improvements in quality.   The availability of a wide selection of excellent 
wines has been equally or more crucial than reasonable prices to the international 
competitiveness of Argentine wines.  Particularly advantaged are the sales of lower and 
mid-priced wines retailing for under U.S.$10 or between $10 and $30.  Industry 
executives concur that these products are simply “unbeatable.”
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While their low and medium-priced wines may be leaders in the international 
price/quality ratio battles, the Argentines have not overlooked the higher level products 
that were so influential at the beginning of the export endeavor.  Aware of the impact of 
icon wines on the brand recognition of individual wineries and on brand/Argentina as a   31
whole, various winemakers have dedicated considerable effort to producing bottlings that 
can both garner top awards at international wine competitions and the praise of influential 
critics from Robert Parker on down.  Selling for up to US$200, they share various 
features of vineyard management and wine making as well as high prices.  Some of these 
include reliance on vines between 40 and 80 years old, highly controlled pruning and 
canopy management, the selection of the best bunches at harvest, manual separation of 
the grapes on special sorting tables, the use of special yeasts for fermentation and storage 
in new French oak barrels for extended periods.  The results are reflected quantitatively 
in the point scores used in their rankings by two prestigious publications, The Wine 
Spectator and The Wine Enthusiast.  The ratings of Argentine wines have jumped 
impressively over the course of the industry’s reconversión. In 1993, for example, the 
maximum attained in The Wine Spectator was 89 points; in 2006 it was 95 points.  For 
The Wine Enthusiast, the highest mark in 1996 was 87 points; in 2007 it had risen to 94 
points.  Also, three Argentine wines made both magazines’ 2006 “Top 100 Wines of the 
World” lists. The enthusiasm for Argentina’s icon wines is powerfully reflected in 
positive reviews that exalt them as “ultra rich,” “very muscular,” “so vivid, so pure, so 
full of pent-up energy.”  “They combine the best of both worlds—hedonistic style and 
authentic terroir.”
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One final form of communication from international markets concerns wine labeling.  
For label design, both front and back, producers have been highly sensitive to the 
particularities of specific markets.  Their goal has been to design labels that communicate 
“mystique” and individuality while incorporating the most persuasive local “codes” of   32
different market segments.  Importers and distributors have had major participation in 
export labeling, providing decisive input on label designs and overall point of sale 
materials.  As importer/distributor Suárez comments, “We are always in the loop.”  This 
process has resulted in an abundance of catchy labels at the entry level and more elegant, 
classy examples at mid and upper ranges.  Examples of highly focused packaging include 
FECOVITA’s creation of specific labels to target Hispanics in the U.S. and Bodega 




Attention to label design is just one element of a growing drive to brand Argentina’s 
wines. In this process, wineries have been particularly intent on distinguishing 
themselves from the bulk production of previous decades.  Some have even changed their 
names in order to project a new and attractive image.  Highly successful industry pioneer 
José Alberto Zuccardi, for example, converted his enterprise from La Agrícola into 
Familia Zuccardi “because La Agrícola gave the idea of something anonymous, of a 
cooperative.  It didn’t give the idea of a family structure, of a very personalized firm.”
55   
 
The concepts of “family” and “personalized” enterprises have taken physical forms over 
the past decade with the building of iconic wineries that dot the landscape of Argentina’s 
wine regions.   Various architects have gained strong reputations by translating brand 
identity into built structures.  Nearly all of these new wineries incorporate attractive 
public spaces and use innovative forms of lighting to involve visitors in the production 
process while communicating the mystique of the wine.  At the same time that these   33
edifices have created high profiles for leading producers they have contributed to the 
rapid expansion of Argentine wine tourism.  Since 2000 industry associations and various 
universities have been encouraging this process by launching well-funded studies to 
analyze the present and future of wine tourism, carefully mapping out wine routes and 
offering specialized training courses for winery personnel.  These efforts are clearly 
bearing fruit; in 2006 alone, wine tourism increased by 45 percent. For the growing 
numbers of domestic and foreign tourists, wineries have begun to hire dedicated staffs, to 
hold special musical and arts events and to build restaurants and small hotels on the 
premises.  Initially producers saw tourism mainly as a way to increase brand visibility.  
Subsequently it has become a means to augment wine sales; boutique wineries record up 
to 50 percent of income from this source, and the direct sales of larger firms have 
surged.
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Wine tourism, new branding and labeling, high profile wineries, all-expense trips for 
importers and distributors, participation in wine fairs:  all are components of an array of 
tactics pursued by individual firms and winery associations to advance their marketing 
efforts.  Of particular note in recent years has been the series of ambitious advertising 
campaigns targeting international and domestic markets.  For exports, an oft-repeated 
maxim of marketing consultants has been that continued growth hinges on the industry’s 
ability to create a distinctive identity.  The 2005 assessment of British expert Tim Atkin 
typifies these views: “What is needed is to ‘sell yourself’ as a country.  This is such an 
attractive place, with so much culture and natural beauty…but most people don’t know 
it.” Argentine wine executives agree.  In the words of Peñaflor’s Export Manager Juan   34
José Canay, “you can sell much more than the wine itself.  You sell its origins, you sell 
the country, you sell the culture of a place.  If you create an image of good Argentine 
wine, you also create an image of Argentina.”
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Canay’s proposal to build a country brand took concrete form in 2006 when Wines of 
Argentina, the leading industry trade group with a membership that controls 95 percent of 
exports, contracted with prominent local advertising agency González Taboada Guevara 
to design an advertising campaign for its principal markets –the U.S., the U.K. and 
Brazil-- at a cost of US$650,000.  Three years earlier they had financed a market study on 
the strengths and weaknesses of the image of Argentine wines in Europe and the U.S. Not 
surprisingly, tango, soccer and a series of attractive and identifiable vistas of the country 
were the most positive associations.  The eventual campaign features ten large format 
color ads, “Unique landscapes, unique wines” to be placed in prestigious wine 
publications including Wine Spectator, Wine Entusiast, Wine and Spirits, Food & Wine, 
(U.S,) Decanter, (UK)  Wine Style, Adega, Prazeres da Mesa, (Brazil) at a cost of up to 
US$25,000 each .  The ads highlight Argentine landscapes and cultural icons seen 
through a glass of wine.
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The use the country as the prominent element in wine branding is abundantly clear in the 
extensive picture gallery on the Wines of Argentina website.  Of the 76 photos, 44 focus 
directly on wine, wine production, grapes or vineyards while 32 depict the richness of the 
land or show identifiable national symbols including tango, gauchos and beef.  Two 
images that exemplify the brand/Argentina message portray men harvesting in the   35
vineyards and a couple dancing tango.  In the first, the laborers are covered in a hazy mist 
that fades the color of the picture, making its protagonists almost blend into the land and 
the vines, becoming part of the wine itself.  The faded look of the picture communicates a 
feeling of antiquity, timelessness and tradition, of a place where things have always been 
done carefully and by hand.  In the second photo, flanked by rows of barrels in a wine 
cellar, the two dancers are locked in a passionate embrace.  The feeling and romance of 
the dance are meant to parallel those elements in the wine and to suggest that by drinking 
it one can experience the same emotions.
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One final marketing tactic employed by several major producers has been to promote 
favorable reviews of their wines.  Once again Nicolás Catena pioneered these efforts 
when in 2000 he decided to launch a new icon wine at a significantly higher price point 
than his previous bottlings.  Following the recommendation of his international 
distributor Alfred Bartholomaus, he sponsored a series of highly publicized blind tastings 
in the U.S. and the U.K., pitting his top Cabernet blend against some of the world’s most 
reputable wines including Chateau Latour, Haut Brion, Caymus SS and Opus One.  His 
goal, to validate the wine’s quality and justify its price, was achieved; Catena was ranked 
first at seven of the nine tastings and placed second at the other two.  A more commonly 
employed tactic has been to contract prominent public relations firms that undertake to 
introduce the wines to influential critics and obtain hopefully favorable reviews. One way 
of achieving critical acclaim, according to some industry insiders, is to place ads in 
specific wine publications, thereby increasing the odds for a review and perhaps a few 
more points as well.  However achieved, as Patricia Ortiz of Tapiz explains, the   36




Argentine Wine Futures 
 
Over the past decade the Argentine wine industry has undergone a veritable revolution, 
from the thorough upgrading of vineyards and many wineries to a dramatic improvement 
in the quality of its products.  A major driver of these developments has been the decisive 
shift in emphasis from domestic consumers to export markets and the associated concern 
for devising effective marketing strategies.  For an entire century after its founding in the 
1880s, the wine industry formulated its business plans based on the perception of an 
undifferentiated mass of local consumers; during this period the concept of marketing 
itself was virtually non-existent.  In contrast, the last decade has witnessed the agile 
responses of the country’s leading firms to the challenges of new markets, proving 
themselves sensitive both to the distinctions between local and export markets and to a 
multiplicity of consumer segments.  But will the Argentine wine industry be able to 
confront the future challenges of an ever changing international panorama with the same 
agility?  While historians should never make predictions and even less suggest definitive 
answers, it is worth briefly outlining the major issues that will shape the future of 
Argentine wine and discovering what major industry actors are thinking. 
 
The three key factors for maintaining export growth are the same ones that explain the 
progress of the past decade: competitive pricing; the strength of demand from external   37
markets; and the identification of Argentine wines as special and worth drinking.   The 
highly favorable price/quality ratio of Argentine wine has certainly been a crucial 
component of export success.  In the present context, several suggest the persistence of 
this comparative advantage, while others appear to threaten it.  On the plus side is the 
continued pegging of the peso to the U.S. dollar.  If the dollar remains weak, so does the 
peso making Argentine wines relatively inexpensive at all price levels, particularly in 
comparison with those produced in European countries tied to the stronger Euro.  In past 
months, the Argentine government has devalued the peso at even a faster rate than the 
dollar’s slide, the exchange rate slipping from approximately 3 to 1 to nearly 3.20 to 1.  
In large measure, this policy has been a response to a marked upswing in domestic 
inflation leading to increased costs for Argentine wine makers and for national industry 
in general.  The specter of yet more severe price increases, harkening back to the days of 
hyper-inflation, and the real rise in expenditures for essential imports from Euro currency 
countries, principally French oak barrels and Portuguese corks, represents a genuine 
danger to the comparative pricing advantage that has been fundamental to the export 
growth of recent years.    
 
The drop in the dollar presents still another problem for the Argentine wine industry: its 
possible linkage to a major downturn in the U.S. and perhaps in other global economies.  
It is encouraging that declines in real income in the U.S. have not yet been reflected in 
lower wine consumption.  And given Argentina’s price advantages, its wines should fare 
well even in more difficult economic times.  Nevertheless, the specter of recession in 
their most important and fastest growing export destination has become an incentive for   38
Argentine producers to seek new international markets.  Induced by the economic slump 
following the 911 attacks, various firms had already begun to look for future growth in 
Asia and the non-traditional wine countries of Northern Europe. Also other Latin 
American countries are becoming attractive possibilities, above all Brazil with its 
enormous population, strengthening national currency and Mercosur free trade 
relationship with Argentina.    
 
Economics aside, a driving force of Argentina’s export boom has been the admirable 
quality of its wines, particularly the attraction of its emblematic Malbec.  But given that 
its uniqueness is a key element of Malbec’s appeal, is the wine’s lure ultimately a 
temporary fad?  Will consumers tire of Malbec in time?  Should the Argentine industry 
continue to stake its fortunes largely on this one successful varietal, or should it seek to 
promote new wines on the international market?   
 
Most experts voice optimism about the long-term prospects of Malbec.  Among its 
enthusiasts are some of the wine world’s most influential critics and consultants.  
Remember that Robert Parker hardly evoked the image of a passing fancy when he 
asserted that during the next decade Malbec would take its place among “the pantheon of 
noble wines.”  Parker’s Argentine representative Jay Miller expressed similar views on 
his recent visits to Argentina: “To conquer the market, Argentina should continue 
promoting Malbec….Malbec is what distinguishes Argentina within the 
multitude….Malbec is real, it is not something that will go out of style….Malbec has 
great room to grow, because from its entry-price wines on up you find very good   39
options.”
61  Renowned French consultant Michel Rolland is even more categorical in his 
support: “There is no reason for Argentina to change varietal.  It is functioning so well 
with Malbec that I see no reason to try something else.”
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That Malbec will most probably continue to be the driver of international sales does not 
mean that Argentine wineries have become complacent.  Within the last three years 
export leaders, including Catena, Peñaflor (Trapiche) and Zuccardi to mention just a few, 
have begun to offer a broad range of diverse Malbecs at numerous price points from entry 
level to icon.  High-end producer Catena, for example, has moved down, devoting 
substantial resources to the development and marketing of his economical Alamos line.  
Familia Zuccardi has gone in the other direction.  Coming into the export market with 
largely entry-level products, the winery moved first to the mid-level with its Q line and 
most recently to an icon Z.  Another sign of the search for diversity within Malbec has 
been Catena and Trapiche’s launching of expensive single-vineyard Malbecs featuring 
wines from high altitude vineyards with yields of 1 to 1.5 ton yields per acre.  As Catena 
importer Bartholomaus explains, “Since so many Malbecs are coming on the market, this 
is the way for Nicolás to continue to distinguish himself from the rest.”
63  Another 
emerging tendency is to establish the identities of a series of regionally specific Malbecs, 
from Salta’s high altitude plantings in the North to bottlings from the southern region of 
La Patagonia. 
 
  Sommelier Richard DiGiamcomo neatly sums up Malbec’s enduring prospects:  
Malbec will get bigger and will achieve more icon status.  It is the 
equivalent of California Cab which hasn’t gone out of style.  That’s   40
the model for Malbec.  It’s not from anywhere else.  It’s easy to 
pronounce.  It’s full-bodied, great aromas, lots of berries like Cab, 
but more fruit-forward.  It’s a safe wine.  It’s easy to drink.  People 
drink it and like it.”
64
                                         
*Thanks to Mario Stein helping a historian to adopt the approach of a marketer 
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